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JUSTICE FOR OUR CHILDREN: JUSTICE FOR A CHANGE
SHARI SHINKt
"In the little world in which children have their existence,. there is
nothing so finely perceived and so finely felt as injustice."]
- Charles Dickens
INTRODUCTION
Children find themselves in the legal system in a variety of ways-
as the subjects of abuse or custody proceedings, as victims or witnesses
in criminal trials, or as delinquents. Despite the context, their court in-
volvement is often predicated upon the failure of an adult in their lives to
protect them or to guide them. Too often it is the inability of the child's
parents to provide adequate care and supervision that trigger legal pro-
ceedings. Sadly, once a child is caught in the legal system, new opportu-
nities for failure often arise. Having been initially neglected by their
families, these children may then be re-traumatized by the institutions
that purport to serve their "best interests."
Despite decreases in crime and domestic violence, child abuse and
neglect reports have dramatically increased to approximately three mil-
lion per year.2 One need look no further than the cover stories of Time
magazine over the last decade to acquire insight into the shortcomings of
"the system's" ability to protect children. The cover of the December 11,
1995 Time issue features a black and white photo of six-year-old Elisa
Izquierda. The angelic appearance of Elisa is contradicted by the head-
line describing her horrific fate--"A Shameful Death: Let down by the
system, murdered by her mom, a little girl symbolizes America's failure
to protect its children.",3 Elisa's mother had forced the child to eat her
own feces and violated her with a toothbrush and hairbrush before even-
tually bludgeoning Elisa to death.4 As tragic as Elisa's demise was, even
more troubling is the knowledge that it could have been prevented.
Neighbors had heard Elisa's cries for months and the city authorities had
t Founder and Executive Director, Rocky Mountain Children's Law Center. The Author
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1. CHARLES DICKENS, GREAT EXPECTATIONS 30 (Harper & Brothers 1877) (1860).
2. Annie G. Steinberg, Barbra Bennett Woodhouse, & Alyssa Burrell Cowan, Child-
Centered, Vertically Structured, and Interdisciplinary: An Integrative Approach to Children 's Pol-
icy, Practice, and Research, 40 FAM. CT, REV. 116, 117 (2002).
3. TIME, Dec. 11, 1995, at cover.
4. David VanBiema, Abandoned to Her Fate: Neighbors, teachers and the authorities all
knew Elisa Izquierdo was being abused. But somehow nobody managed to stop it, TIME, Dec. 11,
1995, at 32.
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been notified at least eight times of the abuse.5 Despite the evidence of
abuse and concerns for Elisa's safety from friends and family, a judge
awarded full custody to Elisa's mother. 6 Calls to Elisa's child welfare
caseworker were met either by no response or by claims that he was "too
busy" to check up on the family.7 All of the adults in the system respon-
sible for protecting Elisa-police, judges, and caseworkers-either failed
to recognize the threats to her safety or simply ignored her perilous situa-
tion altogether.
Another six-year-old child, Terrell Peterson, serves as cover model
for the November 13, 2000 issue of Time. Again, the reality of the head-
line betrays the innocence of his photo--"The Shame of Foster Care:
The coroner gave up counting injuries inflicted on six-year-old Terrell
Peterson. A Time investigation into a system in shambles."8 After inves-
tigating reports that Terrell's mother had been neglecting him, the Geor-
gia Department of Family and Children Services (DFACS) placed the
child with his step-grandmother despite the fears expressed by his mother
that the woman would harm Terrell.9 As it turns out, Terrell's mother's
fears were well-grounded-Terrell died after suffering severe abuse in-
cluding being cut, burned by cigarettes, whipped, and chained to a rail-
ing.10 Terrell's death resulted not only from the injuries inflicted by his
step-grandmother, but also by the system's failure to adequately assess
his situation. The DFACS not only ignored his mother's pleas to remove
him from his step-grandmother's home, but even went so far as to help
the step-grandmother obtain legal custody of Terrell." Having taken
control over Terrell's placement, the DFACS then failed to take the ac-
tions necessary to ensure his safety.
Colorado had its own tragic headline, "Little Girl Lost", 2 detailing
the horrors inflicted on five-year-old Stephanie Martinez. There were so
many visible warning signs, all of them repeatedly ignored.' 3 When
Stephanie lay dying alone in a closet, she had reportedly been scalded,
beaten, whipped, starved and tortured.1 4 The pathologist who performed
the autopsy counted 130 bruises and injuries all over Stephanie's body.' 5
More recently, New Jersey's child welfare system has been criti-
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Vanessa and Raymond Jackson after authorities discovered that four of
their adopted children-ages nine to nineteen-were being starved by
the Jacksons, barely surviving on a diet of peanut butter, pancake batter,
and even wallboard. 16 Since the New Jersey Division of Youth and Fam-
ily Services (DYFS) has no official oversight of adopted kids, even regu-
lar visits by a caseworker to check on foster children living in the home
did not lead to a reporting of the suspected abuse. 17 In January of 2005,
authorities arrested Florida couple John and Linda Dollar who had fled to
Utah after accusations that they had abused seven of their adopted chil-
dren.' 8 In addition to beating their children, the Dollars also allegedly
shocked them, yanked their nails out, and starved them. 19 So severe was
the malnourishment that the Dollar's twin fourteen-year-old boys,
adopted at age four from Florida Department of Children and Families,
weighed only thirty-six and thirty-eight pounds each. 20
Unfortunately these stories are not rare occurrences exploited by
sensational journalists to sell magazines. Those within the legal system
have also been confronted with similar examples of the failure to protect
abused and neglected children. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County De-
21partment of Social Services, the United States Supreme Court held that
substantive due process did not require the county's social services de-
22partment to intervene to protect a child from his father's violence. In
his dissent, Justice Blackmun decried the majority's lack of compassion
for the abused child, Joshua DeShaney:
Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible,
bullying, cowardly, and intemperate father, and abandoned by
respondents who placed him in a dangerous predicament and
who knew or learned what was going on, and yet did essen-
tially nothing except . . . "dutifully recorded these incidents in
[their] files." It is a sad commentary upon American life, and
constitutional principles-so full of late of patriotic fervor and
proud proclamations about "liberty and justice for all"-that
16. Susannah Meadows & Brian Braiker, Arrested Development, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 10, 2003,
at 39.
17. Id.




21. 489 U.S. 189(1989).
22. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 194-203. In DeShaney, because Joshua's attorneys did not raise
the point in the courts below, the Court declined to consider whether "the Wisconsin child protection
statutes gave Joshua an 'entitlement' to receive protective services in accordance with the terms of
the statute, an entitlement which would enjoy due process protection against state deprivation .... "
Id at 195 n.2. In a recent opinion, however, the Court closed the procedural due process door to
children like Joshua by declaring, "In light of today's decision and that in DeShaney, the benefit that
a third party may receive from having someone else arrested for a crime generally does not trigger
protections under the Due Process Clause, neither in its procedural nor in its 'substantive' manifesta-
tions." Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2810 (2005).
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this child, Joshua DeShaney, now is assigned to live out the
remainder of his life profoundly retarded. 3
Elisa, Terrell, Stephanie, the Jackson children, and Joshua,
along with the infinite number of children throughout the nation
whose stories go untold, stand as primary evidence that America is
doing something wrong. Every year approximately one million
children in the United States are victims of child maltreatment,
with over one thousand of these incidents resulting in the child's
death.24 One might expect that with the safeguards and trappings
of a complex legal system, American children would not fall
through the proverbial cracks. Sadly the system has not only failed
to achieve its goals but has in many ways exacerbated those prob-
lems it seeks to remedy by intervening. The institutionalized
power of the state harms children with impunity in an area of the
law that is solely designed to protect them. In other areas of the
law in which children are implicated, the same is often true.
This article argues that the current legal system does not, and
inherently cannot adequately protect the rights of children. The
system is designed primarily to protect adults; and without effec-
tive legal representation, children are denied fundamental due
process. Part I illustrates through three recent cases how the legal
system fails children. Part II elaborates on the legal system's
treatment of children's legal issues. Finally, Part III proposes
changes to insure a child-centered system of decision-making.
I. RECENT CASES: HOW THE LEGAL SYSTEM FAILS CHILDREN
The symposium planners have selected three cases through which to
explore the treatment of children in the legal system-Nicholson v.
Scoppetta,25 Crawford v. Washington,26 and Simmons v. Roper.27 While
each of these cases involves children, upon closer examination, their
analyses provide compelling evidence of the inherent failure of our legal
system to address the needs of children. The fundamental problem is the
fact that the United States legal system is designed to protect the rights of
adults. Steeped in tradition, the rights of children warrant protection
only insofar as they implicate adult interests. Accordingly, none of these
cases provide an accurate analysis of the legal rights of children, but
rather, an analysis of adult rights as they happen to relate to children.
23. Id. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (second alteration in original) (citation omitted).
24. Marvin L. Ventrell, Rights & Duties: An Overview of the A ttorney-Child Client Relation-
ship, 26 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 259, 264 (1995).
25. 820 N.E.2d 840 (2004).
26. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
27. 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003).
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The fact that children remain a tangential issue in each of the cases is
indicative of how courts in general view children.
A. Nicholson v. Scoppetta: A Domestic Violence Issue
Nicholson v. Scoppetta is a federal class action in which several fe-
male victims of domestic violence alleged that the New York City Ad-
ministration for Children's Services (ACS) violated their constitutional
rights when it removed their children from them based on a finding that
the children had been exposed to domestic violence, and therefore ne-
glected.28 The court held that where the sole allegation of neglect is that
the mother allowed the child to witness domestic abuse, the mother can-
not be held responsible for neglect.
29
While the outcome of this case will significantly impact the lives of
children, it is clear that the court views Nicholson strictly from the per-
spective of domestic violence. Children enter into the discussion only
because it is the fundamental right of the mother to raise her children that
is threatened by the ACS removal policy. The court in Nicholson views
the child in the context of the mothers' rights, not as a separate person
deserving of protection. The primary focus in the case is the mother's
rights. First and foremost, the court wants to ensure that the mother's
constitutional rights are not violated by the ACS's removal of her chil-
dren. Only after proper constitutional safeguards are provided to protect
the mother's rights, does the court then consider the implications of
ACS's actions on the children.
However, child victims in domestic violence cases are typically not
represented. Courts and battered women's advocates have long mini-
mized the impact of domestic violence on children by describing the
child as a witness, not a victim. Witnessing domestic violence is experi-
encing the horror of it in all its brutal detail: six year olds calling 9-1-1
and toddlers hiding under the bed in the midst of yelling and broken
dishes. While professional organizations and advocates continue to em-
phasize the devastation domestic violence has on children, advocacy on
their behalf is often not addressed.
B. Crawford v. Washington: A Hearsay Issue
In Crawford v. Washington, Crawford, an adult, was charged with
assault and attempted murder. The trial allowed a recorded statement as
evidence and Crawford was convicted. The United States Supreme Court
held that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment prohibits
out-of-court statements by witnesses that are testimonial in nature.30 The
holding in Crawford tightened the previous standard for the admissibility
28. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 842-44.
29. Id. at 844-47.
30. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69.
20051
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of hearsay testimony articulated in Ohio v. Roberts.3' Although the
Court did not explicitly describe what types of statements it may con-
sider "testimonial," it hinted that any statements the declarant would
reasonably expect to be later used in a court of law, such as statements to
police during interrogation or statements made to a physician, would
qualify as testimonial.32
The primary concern of the Court in Crawford is the protection of
the accused's constitutional right to confrontation. The case lacks any
discussion of how the holding may potentially impair the role of children
in the legal system. The Court goes into a lengthy discussion of the his-
torical development of cross-examination dating as far back as Roman
and Colonial times.33 Notably, these are both eras in which children
were completely absent from the legal world. Today, however, children
routinely find themselves in court, primarily as victims, and sometimes
as witnesses, or as the accused.
Although the facts in Crawford do not involve children, the case's
holding has many implications for children as witnesses. In a situation
where the witness against the accused happens to be a child, it is clear
that the rights of the accused will trump any consideration of the child
witness's interests. Child abuse cases present the most likely setting for
Crawford to affect children because the victims in these cases do not
always appear in court.3a Prior to Crawford, prosecutors often played
videotaped interviews of the victim if the child was too young to tes-
tify.3 5  After Crawford, this practice will be impermissible and many
convictions based on such recorded testimony may be subject to rever-
sal.36 The full impact of Crawford has yet to be determined as practitio-
ners alter their behavior and test the limits of the ruling.
Crawford also highlights the deeper issue of how courts deal with
child witnesses generally, not just in the context of hearsay statements in
child abuse trials. Courts strictly adhere to established norms of proce-
dure to ensure the rights of the accused, despite the potential trauma to
child witnesses in an adversarial system. The unfamiliar environment of
the courtroom, the impersonal approach of the attorneys and recounting
the traumatic experience itself may all serve to inflict more harm on the
child witness. Direct and cross-examination, which may confuse and
intimidate children, are not the best means of eliciting truthful informa-
31. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). In Roberts, the statement of an unavailable
hearsay declarant may be admitted only if it bears adequate "indicia of reliability." Id. Statements
that fall within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or show "particularized guarantees of trustwor-
thiness" may be inferred as reliable. Id.
32. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.
33. Id. at 43-50.
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tion from a child.3 7 Child witnesses are not independently represented,
as other witnesses who may rely on legal counsel to advocate and protect
their interests.
In addition to the impact Crawford will have on the court's treat-
ment of child witnesses, the holding may also lead to decreased prosecu-
tions and convictions of some alleged child abusers. Crawford will ex-
clude many child hearsay statements when in-court, under-oath testi-
mony is not available.38 Many times, the child victim may be the most
knowledgeable about the torture inflicted upon him or her. Where the
strength of the case depends on the testimony of a child who is incompe-
tent to take the stand, the inadmissibility of hearsay statements may be
fatal to the prosecution's case.39 Faced with this prospect, many prosecu-
tors have already given up on otherwise promising child abuse cases.4°
This is a striking example where a child's seeming incompetence is used
not as a shield to protect the child, but a sword that denies accountability
for harm inflicted by adults.
C. Simmons v. Roper: A Capital Punishment Issue
In Simmons v. Roper, Simmons committed murder when he was
seven years old and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Missouri
held that recent legislative action supports a finding that a national con-
sensus has developed against the execution of defendants under age
eighteen at the time of their offense. 4' The United States Supreme Court
in Thompson v. Oklahoma said that the determination of what constitutes
"cruel and unusual" punishment should be evaluated according to
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society. 42 In the fourteen years following the Supreme Court's ruling in
Stanford v. Kentucky,43 only eighteen states have barred executions of
juveniles. However, no state has lowered its minimum age of execution
below eighteen, and the overall imposition of the juvenile death penalty
has become increasingly rare.44 Thus, the court in Simmons concluded
that based on such evidence of a national trend against the juvenile death
37. Leigh Goodmark, From Property to Personhood: What the Legal System Should Do for
Children in Family Violence Cases, 102 W. VA. L. REv. 237, 294 (1999).
38. Davis, supra note 34 passim.
39. Id.
40. According to Victor Vieth, director of the American Persecutors Research Institute's
National Child Protection Training Center, "A lot of prosecutors have just thrown in the towel." Id.
at 24.
41. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 397.
42. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821 (1988).
43. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 361 (holding that execution of individuals who were age sixteen
or seventeen at the time of the crimes did not violate constitutional prohibitions of cruel and unusual
punishment because no national consensus existed against such executions).
44. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 399.
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penalty, the Supreme Court today would likely hold that these types of
executions violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.45
On March 1, 2005 the United States Supreme Court issued its ruling
in Roper v. Simmons,46 confirming the predictions expressed by the Mis-
souri Supreme Court and overruling Sanford. In the majority opinion,
Justice Kennedy held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments pro-
hibit execution of defendants who were under eighteen years of age at
the time they committed their crime.47 The Court first determined that
the various state legislative actions banning the juvenile death penalty
provided evidence that a national consensus had developed in opposition
to the execution of individuals who had committed their crimes as mi-
nors.48 Additionally, the Court used its own independent judgment to
come to the conclusion that the death penalty is a disproportionate pun-
ishment for juveniles, due in large part to the reduced culpability of
young offenders which negates the retribution and deterrence rationales
behind such a severe form of punishment.49
At every stage of Christopher Simmons's case, from the Missouri
courts to the United States Supreme Court, the system viewed the defen-
dant primarily as a death row inmate, not as a child. While age and the
special circumstances that accompany it serve as a major factor in the
court's ultimate decision, the main focus of the case never shifts far from
the overarching theme of whether or not the death penalty itself is justifi-
able in any case. The historical development of death penalty jurispru-
dence in the United States, cited by both the Missouri Supreme Court
and the United States Supreme Court, reflects the nation's changing
opinion of capital punishment in general, rather than a changing view of
how the legal system should treat child offenders.
While the Supreme Court ultimately came to the correct decision
regarding capital punishment of juveniles, this latest opinion, along with
earlier cases addressing the issue, almost entirely ignores the causal con-
nection between the legal system's treatment of children in areas such as
abuse and neglect and their eventual involvement in the criminal system.
Often the children who become alleged delinquents in juvenile court,
including death penalty cases, are the same children who were once the
victims of severe abuse and neglect. Studies show a startling correlation
between risk factors for children in both the child welfare and juvenile
justice systems. 50 Regrettably, our political system ignores the long-term
costs of child abuse and neglect such as criminal activity, substance
45. Id. at 400.
46. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
47. Id. at 1194.
48. Id. at 1192-94.
49. Id. at 1195-97.
50. Claudette Brown, Crossing Over: From Child Welfare to Juvenile Justice, MARYLAND
BAR JOURNAL, May/June 2003, at 22.
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abuse, domestic violence, and unemployment, which often plague mal-
treated children into adulthood. 51 In a cruel irony, the state that failed to
protect these children ultimately ends up incarcerating them as a means
of protecting society from their delinquent behavior.
Unfortunately, there is far too little collaboration between
abuse/neglect and delinquency professionals, especially considering the
fact that these two areas each have responsibility for the same children
and often do not even realize it.52 Perhaps now that the Supreme Court
has resolved the debate over the juvenile death penalty, the legal system
can begin to focus more attention on the root cause of why these young
people find themselves defendants in such serious cases in the first place.
Cooperation between the abuse/neglect and delinquency systems is es-
sential. A step in the right direction, movements have begun to require
dual agency involvement in the hopes of providing increased attention
for these so-called "nexus kids".
5 3
II. THE DISTORTED VIEW OF CHILDREN IN THE UNITED STATES LEGAL
SYSTEM
The three cases discussed above, though involving children in vari-
ous ways, merely skim the surface of the larger issue of how the legal
system treats children. These cases do, however, provide snapshots of
the various ways in which the courts have failed to adequately consider,
then meet, the special needs of children. This section analyzes in more
depth the various deficiencies of the system in regard to its treatment of
children. Part IIA outlines the inherent inability of a system designed for
adults to protect the rights of children. Part IIB discusses the disadvan-
tages to children of giving undue weight in light of facts to the rights of
parents in protection and custody cases. Finally, Part IIC gives a brief
overview of federal law involving children.
A. The Legal System is Designed to Protect Adult Rights
When considering what goals society hopes to advance through a
complex legal system, one plausible answer is the protection of an indi-
vidual's rights. But exactly whose rights-and even more specifically,
which rights-are important enough to warrant the full protection of our
legal system is a question apparently so obvious that we seldom even ask
it. In a legal system designed by adults, and arguably for adults, it is
clear that only those rights considered fundamental by individuals with
the requisite level of maturity will be relevant to the courts. As a result
of this inattentiveness to the experiences and feelings of children, the
51. Elizabeth Bartholet, The Challenge of Children's Rights Advocacy: Problems and Pro-
gress in the Area of Child Abuse and Neglect, 3 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADvoC. 215, 220
(2004).
52. Brown, supra note 50, at 19.
53. See id.
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legal system shows an exaggerated reverence to adult authority.54 When
children become participants in this system, they find themselves subject
to rules which rarely contemplated their special needs. Unfortunately,
even in the best circumstances, this places children on an uneven playing
field with little chance of a meaningful victory.
One example of this is a custody dispute. States vary in the weight
accorded to children's preferences in custody battles. 55 Although most
states allow courts to consider the child's wishes,56 the legal system in
general typically denies children any meaningful voice in custody dis-
putes that profoundly affect their lives. How the court becomes aware of
the child's wishes if it even chooses to hear them may vary from court-
room to courtroom.
In re the Marriage of Hartley provides an illustration of how courts
overlook the expressed interests of children in custody cases. In Hartley,
the court appointed a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of
twelve-year-old Eric Hartley in a custody dispute following the divorce
of his parents.57 Throughout the proceedings, Eric voiced concerns to
both the court and his guardian ad litem that his interests were not being
adequately represented in court.5 8 The Children's Legal Clinic then filed
an entry of appearance on Eric's behalf, arguing that due to abuse by
Eric's stepfather in his mother's home, custody of Eric should be
awarded to his father. 59 The Supreme Court of Colorado ruled that even
though the guardian ad litem did not voice Eric's custody preferences to
the court, the court appointed guardian ad litem sufficiently represented
Eric's interests. 60 This ruling demonstrates the court's unwillingness to
give credence to the child's complaints about the guardian ad litem's
lack of time and attention to his case, his failure to get to know his client,
or understand his needs, as well as not expressing his preference. Thus,
the court failed to realize that what Eric wanted was also factually in his
best interests. In fact, the trial court granted Eric's wish to live with his
father because it was in his best interests. What the Supreme Court re-
fused to find was that Eric had a right to an attorney to promote his view.
The interests of a child involved in a custody dispute are often com-
pletely foreign to adults. In the midst of conflict, an adult man or woman
may become, even unconsciously, self involved and cannot appropriately
empathize with the child's feeling of being emotionally torn between the
54. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Enhancing Children's Role in Policy Formation, 45 ARIZ.
L. REv. 751, 752 (2003).
55. Barbara A. Atwood, The Child's Voice in Custody Litigation: An Empirical Study and
Suggestions for Reform, 45 ARIZ. L. REv. 629, 630 (2003).
56. See id
57. In re Marriage of Hartley, 886 P.2d 665, 667 (Colo. 1994).
58. Id. at 668.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 676.
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people they most love in their lives and on whom they are completely
dependent. Parents often do not recognize the divided loyalty a child
may feel. Yet the courts have less difficulty declaring that a child would
desire freedom of speech or freedom of choice, even though such con-
cepts may be outside the scope of a child's understanding. Similarly,
adults may promote an eighteen month old's right to confidentiality in
the child welfare system, while denying her more compelling right to a
permanent home. Such inconsistencies demonstrate the point made by
one commentator that,
We accept that children's claims must fit adult purposes because
children are potential adults and childhood is preparation for adult-
hood. To the extent any child's claim diverges from adult purposes,
then, the law refuses to entertain it. Any purpose or interest of value
only to children as children can command no legal recognition or
representation because, by definition, any such interest or purpose is
merely childish and inferior, of course, but so long as they serve no
politically powerful adult purpose, those claims remain unvoiced.
61
Not only does the legal system illogically ascribe certain adult-
valued rights to children, it also makes light of those issues that impact
only children. Children's relative immaturity is merely a pretext for the
legal system to marginalize children and the issues important to them.62
Children face a disadvantage in the legal system merely because they are
children. Our legal system today views children as impaired adults, in-
capable of understanding or perceiving until they reach adulthood.63 In
this way, the system bars children from adequately redressing injustices
against them in much the same way women and racial minorities experi-
enced exclusion in the past.64
Some commentators argue that unlike other groups deprived of
rights, children have an assured remedy to their inferior legal status in
that they will eventually attain adulthood and all of its accompanying
rights.65 This view not only ignores the foundational value of childhood
but also the fact that the rights denied to children now-particularly in
abuse and neglect cases-may gravely impact their lives after they reach
adulthood. By perpetuating a cycle of violence, drug addiction or wel-
fare dependency, children reach adulthood without ever escaping the
system. Discriminating against children in the legal system does them an
immediate disservice as well as sending them a message about the legal
system that will likely stay with them for years to come. This is not to
say that courts should treat children as miniature adults, but merely that
61. Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives and
the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 14 (1994).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 12.
64. Id. at 16.
65. Harry Brighouse, How Should Children Be Heard? 45 ARIZ. L. REv. 691, 695 (2003).
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courts should recognize the unique needs of children. The law should
not dismiss children's perspectives as immature and inferior, but rather
should respect and embrace their views as simply different.66 This view
demands not only legal protection, but also effective legal representation
to prevent routine harms.
An additional way in which the legal system fails to meet the needs
of children is in its inability to provide timely resolutions to issues. This
effect is most profound in the area of child placement. Court delay pre-
sents one of the biggest obstacles to ensuring that children are placed in a
permanent home.67 While an adult may be annoyed by a case that drags
on, for a child left in limbo about their future such a wait can have seri-
ous long term effects. Studies show that delays in child placement mat-
ters have significant negative impacts on children's development and
may lead to aggressive, even criminal behavior in adolescence and adult-
hood.68 Children also experience lapses in time differently from adults,
and what seems a short period to an adult may be perceived as an eternity
to a child.69 Court delay is just one aspect of an overwhelmed system of
too many cases, and too few workers and judges. Children in this system
are denied services, separated from siblings, arbitrarily and multiply
placed and suffer harm. Judicial accountability compounds this problem
because judges are seldom held responsible for harmful decisions or de-
lays in cases involving children.70 Judicial leadership is critical for creat-
ing a culture of accountability to children, from parents, the state, and the
court, as well as insuring effective legal representation for children.71
Lack of finality in judgments also makes the legal system ill-suited
to resolve children's issues. Where children are involved, an erroneous
decision on the placement of a child will dramatically impact the child's
life. The consequences on the child's growth and development are per-
manent. It makes little difference to a child who was removed from his
or her family, if several months and multiple placements later, the court
decides that the child in fact would have been better served by staying
with the biological parents. The trauma of repeated separations outside a
child's home inflicts lasting scars that all the safeguards of the judicial
system cannot undo. It is unlikely that any later remedy, even a sought
after permanent home, will restore them to a healthy emotional state or
restore their faith in the adults that have failed them.
66. Fitzgerald, supra note 61, at 19.
67. Jessica K. Heldman, Court Delay and the Waiting Child, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1001,
1006 (2003).
68. Id at to]1.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1023.
71. One striking example, in this author's experience, of a juvenile court judge who dramati-
cally and positively changed the culture of the court in a mere two years and insured accountability
to children and families, is The Honorable Chris Melonakis of Colorado's Seventeenth Judicial
District.
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B. Parents' Legal Rights are Always a Major Factor
Even when a dutiful court acknowledges that a child has a legal in-
terest in a dispute, that interest almost always takes a backseat to the con-
stitutional rights of the parent. Once the court takes notice of a parent's
constitutional claim, the only remedy for the child lies in the assertion of
a state interest that derives from an adult perspective.72 In the words of
one commentator, putting the child first is "often difficult and painful. It
is difficult because adults do not have the same needs as children and
cannot easily perceive what they are. It is painful because what is good
for children may be perceived as unfair to adults. 73
The danger in giving such great weight to parental rights is that in
some situations this unequal balancing may lead to outcomes detrimental
to the child. As noted by Richard J. Gelles and Ira Schwartz:
[T]he idea of a level playing field that provides both parties with le-
gal advocacy and allows for an unbiased assessment of the weight of
evidence is an illusion. The child welfare "'playing field" is in reality
decidedly unbalanced, almost always tilted in favor of the parents'
rights at the expense of a child's protection.
74
If the legal system is to give serious consideration to issues affect-
ing children, then courts need to distinguish when a child and parent
have the same interests and when the needs and interests of the parent
and child diverge. 75 Again, adequate legal representation for the child is
critical to this process. Just recently one Federal District Court held that
children have a constitutional right to an attorney in abuse and neglect
cases. 76
Giving more legal rights to children and more power to the state to
enforce these rights, however, conflicts with some of the fundamental
principles underlying the development of our nation's political and legal
structure. Parental autonomy is a concept deeply rooted in America's
traditional value system. 77 A look at Supreme Court decisions involving
family issues indicates a tendency by the Court to defer to the wishes of
the parents. 78 The ideal of parental autonomy has its advantages-it pre-
vents a movement toward a totalitarian government, the fear of which
initially inspired the parental autonomy tradition in America. 79 The chal-
72. Fitzgerald, supra note 61, at 38.
73. Catherine J. Ross, The Tyranny of Time: Vulnerable Children, "Bad" Mothers, and Statu-
tory Deadlines in Parental Termination Proceedings, 11 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 176, 196 (2004).
74. Richard J. Gelles & Ira Schwartz, Children and the Welfare System, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
95, 95 (1999).
75. Ross, supra note 73, at 192.
76. Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1363 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
77. Bartholet, supra note 51, at 217-18.
78. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Parnham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979);
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
79. Bartholet, supra note 51, at 218.
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lenge is to find a more appropriate balance between parents' rights to
raise their children as they see fit and the state's power to protect chil-
dren when parents fail in that role.8
C. Overview of Federal Law
Changes in federal law over the past few decades reflect changing
attitudes regarding the state's role in protecting children. Unfortunately,
just as the court system has failed to adequately address children's issues,
so too has the legislature. Congress has experimented with various legis-
lative acts as a means of protecting abused and neglected children. At
best, these changes in federal law indicate Congress's acknowledgment
that the current federal policy is not working. However, even the latest
child protection laws have the same inherent problem as the prior laws
the were meant to improve upon-they require that the protection of
children is to be decided within a system designed to protect adults, with
little attention to the need for zealous legal representation on behalf of
children.
From 1980 to 1997, a pro-parent emphasis dominated federal law.
The 1980 Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act mandated that if
the government removes children from a home for their protection, it
must take steps to eventually reunify the family.8 1 The Act came as a
response to criticisms that the system had gone too far by removing chil-
dren from their homes without good reason and leaving them in foster
care for too long.82 Designed to fix problems with the foster care system,
the Act conditioned federal funding for foster care on certain reforms.
8 3
In 1997, Congress passed new legislation intended to shift the em-
phasis from the parent to the child. The stated goal of the Adoption and
Safe Families Act (ASFA) is to place a "higher value on children's inter-
ests in safety and in moving on to permanent adoptive homes if their
birth parents cannot demonstrate within a reasonable period of time that
they are capable of providing a nurturing home."84 The legislation at-
tempts to reach this objective in three ways: 1) by identifying situations
where family reunification efforts do not have to be made; 2) by mandat-
ing that states seek termination of the parents' rights in cases where the
child has been out of the home for fifteen of the previous twenty-two
months; and 3) requiring states to implement concurrent planning in case
reunification attempts fail. 85 Despite the lofty goals of ASFA and similar
80. Id. at 217-18.
81. Judge Hector E. Campoy, Symposium Introductory Speech: Youth, Voice and Power:
Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives, 45 ARiz. L. REv. 567, 570 (2003).
82. Marvin L. Ventrell, From Cause to Profession: The Development of Children's Law and
Practice, 32 COLO. LAW. 65, 68 (2003).
83. Id.
84. Bartholet, supra note 51, at 226.
85. Gelles, supra note 74, at 109.
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legislation, lack of funding and other supportive resources mean that
many children are in limbo far too long and are not getting the protection
and care they need and deserve. Laws alone are useless until they are
enforced. For the spirit of child protection laws to be enforced requires
the professional courage to examine what we know and to face the injus-
tice. Doing something about it requires ensuring effective legal repre-
sentation for children, without which they remain voiceless in a system
by and for adults.
According to one commentator, "The child welfare world is littered
with the wreckage of well-intentioned programs designed by adults but
irrelevant to children., 86 Recent studies of children in the foster care
system demonstrate the effects of this wreckage. A report by the Pew
Commission on Children in Foster Care examines the demographics of
the over one-half million children living in foster care throughout the
United States.87 Of these children, more than one-fourth had been in
foster care for between two and five years.88 Seventeen percent had lan-
guished been in foster care for over five years. 89 These alarming statis-
tics support the conclusion drawn by many observers that the current
system of protecting children "merely substitutes government neglect
and mistreatment for parental neglect and abuse." 90 A more recent study
by Casey Family Programs found that adults who had formerly been in
foster care had more mental health problems, were less likely to graduate
from high school, and had lower incomes then those in the general popu-
lation.91 Similar results are documented in the latest Chapin Hall study
in Chicago.92 The disappointment of repeated attempts over two decades
to reform the current system demands recognition that children are enti-
tled to no less than effective legal representation as one critically neces-
sary and overdue reform.
III. MAKING THE CASE
Having established that the legal system in its current state does not
serve the needs of children, one must next consider what changes should
be implemented to remedy these problems. Part IIIA of this section dis-
cusses the need for legal representation. Part IIIB urges the exploration
of innovative and unlimited options, in ensuring this benefit.
86. Woodhouse, supra note 54, at 754.
87. See ALFRED PEREZ ET AL., THE PEW COMMISSION ON CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE,
DEMOGRAPHICS OF CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE (Sept. 16, 2003), at http://pewfostercare.org/
research/docs/Demographics0903.pdf.
88. Id. at 3.
89 Id.
90. Gelles, supra note 74, at 111.
91. CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, IMPROVING FAMILY FOSTER CARE: FINDINGS FROM THE
NORTHWEST FOSTER CARE ALUMNI STUDY 32-36 (Apr. 6, 2005), at http://www.casey.org/
Resources/Publications/NorthwestAlumniStudy.htm.
92. Monica Davey, Those Who Outgrow Foster Care Still Struggle, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES,
May 19, 2005, § A, at 16.
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A. The Critical Role of the Child's Attorney
Absent the assistance of legal representation, a child has no realistic
prospect of successfully navigating the complexities of the court system.
Therefore it is necessary that an adult act as the child's voice to insure
that the court recognizes the legal interests of the child. Until 1974, the
federal government had not even recommended-much less mandated-
that states have guardians ad litem represent children's legal rights.
93
Only about half of all states require that courts appoint lawyers for
abused children.94 Whether lawyers or guardians ad litem are appointed,
the exact role of the child's representative remains unsettled.
A quick glance through the literature on the subject of representing
children reveals a wide range of views as to the attorney's function when
dealing with a child client. The "best interests" model requires that the
attorney ascertain and advocate for the child's best interests, taking the
child's wishes into account only as one factor in this determination. In
contrast, the traditional attorney-client approach takes the view that the
attorney should represent the child in the same manner as he or she
would represent an adult client. Following this model, the attorney
would allow the child client to determine the direction of the case. 96 No
state has endorsed a child's attorney model exclusively, though the
American Bar Association and the National Association of Counsel rec-
ommend versions of this model for children. The guardian ad litem is a
hybrid of these two models-the attorney serves as a lawyer in the tradi-
tional sense, but advocates for the child's best interests when conflicts
arise between the child's expressed wishes and his or her best interests.
97
Even more divergent views of the attorney-child relationship argue that
financial and time constraints justify the position that a child's attorney
has no obligation to see their client before court.98
A single definition of the attorney's role, however, is impossible to
reach due to the wide range of circumstances such a description would
necessarily have to encompass. The age, maturity, and intelligence of
the child, as well as the reason for their involvement in the legal system
are just a few of the factors which may impact the responsibilities of the
attorney. This difficulty in establishing a consensus is demonstrated by
the fact that the relationship between children and their legal representa-
93. Gelles & Schwartz, supra note 74, at 109.
94. Shalia Dewan, Abused Children Are Found Entitled to Legal Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9,
2005, § A, at 16.
95. Astra Outley, THE PEW COMMISSION ON CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE, REPRESENTATION
FOR CHILDREN AND PARENTS IN DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS 2-4, at http://pewfostereare.org/
research/docs/Representation.pdf (last visited June 25, 2005).
96. Id.
97. Ventrell, supra note 24, at 279.
98. Marvin Ventrell, Foster Care and Adoption Reform Legislation: Implementing the Adop-
tion and Safe Families Act of 1997, 14 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 433,435 (2000).
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tion varies depending on the state, the case, and the proceeding.99 The
underlying reasons for such inconsistencies include: lack of binding uni-
form standards, scholarly debate over the issue, and insufficient training
and compensation for child attorneys, among others.' 00
According to Martin Guggenheim, the main reason why determin-
ing the proper role of the attorney in the context of young children is so
hard is that this area of law lacks the guidelines that exist in other prac-
tice areas.10 1 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility, which articulate the role of counsel,
assume that the client is an "unimpaired adult."'10 2 Obviously there are
substantial differences between a child and an "unimpaired adult" which
would alter the role of counsel in the context of a child client. Like the
legal system itself, the rules governing the ethics of the legal profession
are dominated by a focus on adult representation, providing virtually no
mention of how an attorney should go about representing a child.'0 3
Regardless of the form an attorney's representation takes, assur-
ances must be made that the quality of representation rises to the level
deserved by children. Whatever the theoretical debate about an attor-
ney's role, practical considerations of compensation and caseload un-
dermine each model. A recent federal district court in Georgia addressed
the connection between caseload and the quality of the child's represen-
tation. In Winn v. Perdue,'°4 the court held that Georgia statutes and the
Georgia Constitution provide foster children with the right to counsel in
deprivation proceedings. 10 5 The court based its holding on the conclu-
sion that a child in a deprivation proceeding inherently has a conflict of
interests with his or her parent, guardian, or custodian, which necessi-
tates a separate legal counsel for the child.106
The right to counsel, the court went on to note, means the right to
effective counsel. 0 7 While the National Association of Counsel for Chil-
dren advises that attorneys representing more than 100 child clients at a
time cannot possibly achieve effective counsel, the two counties in Winn
each had caseloads of 439.2 and 182.8 child clients per attorney.'0 8 The
99. Outley, supra note 95, at 2-4.
100. Id. at 1.
101. Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining the Role of Counsel for Children, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 1399, 1399 (1996).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1401.
104. 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
105. Winn, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1358-61. The Court described such cases with, "[d]eprivation
cases consist of a series of hearings and review proceedings that take place over the course of a
child's stay in the Georgia foster care system." Id. at 1356.
106. Id. at 1359.
107. Id. at 1361.
108. Id. at 1356. The author believes that a child's relationship with her/his attorney in abuse
and neglect cases is critical. That relationship must, by necessity, extend to the foster parents, treat-
ment providers and others. Such relationships are difficult to develop with 100 or more children.
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plaintiffs in Winn presented evidence that the number of cases signifi-
cantly compromised the ability of the counties' child advocate attorneys
to provide adequate representation.10 9 Among this evidence was testi-
mony by attorneys that they often never meet and personally speak with
the children they represent.'
10
When the additional factor of poor compensation is added to the
equation, defining the proper role of the child's attorney becomes even
more complex. Even if an agreement can be reached as to how a lawyer
should properly go about representing a child, there still remains the
looming issue of who compensates, as well as how and whether the
compensation provided for taking on such a role is sufficient incentive
for a lawyer to devote the requisite time and care to the child's case.
Lack of compensation raises the question of whether children can ever be
adequately represented in a system that does not sufficiently reward the
efforts of their lawyers.1 1' The fact that lawyers representing major cor-
porations make many times the income of attorneys representing the
most vulnerable members of society generates accolades for attorneys
serving children. But without close scrutiny of the quality of that repre-
sentation, children continue to be underserved and society's responsibil-
ity goes unattended.
Before any meaningful dialogue can take place in regard to the role
of the child's attorney, the issue of compensation must be addressed.
The inherent value of having lawyers to represent children must be re-
flected in the compensation available for those willing to take on such an
important role. Compensation schemes based on hours spent rather than
number of cases will allow lawyers to give more time and attention to
each child, as opposed to taking on caseloads so large that the quality of
representation is severely diminished. While some jurisdictions imple-
ment such methods, no studies have documented the long-term success
of these compensation reforms on outcomes for children
B. Best Interests Informed by the Least Detrimental Alternative
The "best interests" standard is a rallying cry for children-
compelling, yet elusive. Most courts currently use a "best interests of the
child" standard to determine child placement in the area of dependency
and neglect as well as in custody disputes. The standard has perpetuated
the law's tendency to divert its focus away from the child by concentrat-
ing instead on parental rights and the nebulous concept the courts have
Our respective systems must continue to evaluate the results achieved for children in making these
judgments. With that in mind, it would be appropriate to have an attorney who is not as over-
whelmed as the caseworker, judge and almost every other player in the system.
109. Id. at 1363.
110. Id.
111. Low compensation has been cited as one of the main impediments to quality legal repre-
sentation for children. See Outley, supra note 95, at 4-5, 8.
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paradoxically labeled "best interests of the child."' 1 2  The "best inter-
ests" standard articulates the procedure a judge must follow, but does not
assure children that their lives will be improved by the court's ruling.'"
3
A major shortcoming of the best interest standard is that it poses a
danger that children's futures may be adjudicated on the basis of societal
norms that are immaterial to their well-being. Many factors-gender
issues, constitutional concerns of race and religion, the subjective view
of the judge--can cloud the court's ability to fully and fairly examine
which course of action truly serves the child's best interests. 14 As the
Supreme Court has recognized, courts deciding abuse and neglect cases
are particularly susceptible to bias stemming from race, class, and cul-
ture. 115 Custody disputes also invite the same prejudices when applying
the best interest standard. 16 Stereotypes of men and women may con-
taminate the best interests determination, creating a situation where the
court is in effect choosing between the parental interests of the mother
and father rather than the interests of the child.1' 7 Adding to the ambigu-
ity of the best interest standard is the fact that the United States currently
has no national consensus as to what type of family structure and parent-
ing techniques fulfill the child's best interests."1
8
As mentioned in Part IIB, the child's best interests will always suc-
cumb to the constitutional claims of the parents. 119 This happens most
often in joint custody cases when the court upholds the non-custodial
parents' visitation rights. 120 Even a "bad" parent who does not provide
adequate care or support to their children-and may even be abusive-
retains a constitutional right to visit the children, regardless of the child's
preferences or best interests. 121
In light of the unfavorable outcomes potentially created by use of
the best interests standard alone, judges faced with a choice between
multiple outcomes should augment their decisions by a weighing of
which option would be the "least detrimental alternative" for the child.
122
Under this revised standard, the best interests of the child would remain
the focal point of the court's analysis, but the determination of what is
112. Fitzgerald, supra note 61, at 63-64.
113. Guggenheim, supra note 101, at 1426.
114. Fitzgerald, supra note 61, at 59.
115. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 745 (1982); Fitzgerald, supra note 61, at 61-62.
116. Fitzgerald, supra note 61, at 62.
117. Id. at 59-69.
118. Id. at 62-63.
119. Fitzgerald, supra note 61, at 60.
120. Id.
121. Id. at60.
122. "[B]ecause the best-interests standard did not in and of itself define what it is that a child
needs, we propose that the placement standard should be one that provides the least detrimental
alternative for safeguarding a child's growth and development." JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATtVE 50 (1996) (citation omit-
ted).
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truly in the "best interests of the child" would be made significantly more
accurate by the additional consideration of which alternative would be
the least detrimental. In keeping with the Hippocratic oath of physicians,
attorneys serving children should be called to do no harm.
The standard acknowledges the fact that detriment is inherent in
every child placement decision and that the deprivation of the child's
"best interests" has already taken place. The wording of the "least det-
rimental alternative" reminds courts that their primary task at this point is
to "salvage as much as possible out of a less-than-satisfactory situa-
tion." 1 23 In this way, the least detrimental alternative provides a more
realistic guideline for courts than the best interests standard, which often
involves irrelevant and time-consuming data gathering. 124 This modified
"best interests" standard would be more in harmony with the proposition
that a child's attorney should "maximize the possibility that the case will
impose the least harm possible on the child."'
' 25
In the case In the Interest of A. V.M, 126 the Colorado Court of Ap-
peals in an unpublished opinion agreed that the least detrimental alterna-
tive best serves the child's interests. In A. V.M, an Anglo couple ap-
pealed the trial court's decision to deny their request to adopt their Afri-
can American foster child.127 Despite the fact that the five year old child
had lived in the foster home since infancy, the trial court had refused to
approve his adoption based on a finding that the Anglo foster parents
could not be sensitive to the child's racial and cultural needs, thereby
making them unsuitable adoptive parents. 128 The Colorado Court of Ap-
peals noted that the Colorado statutory law requires that upon removal, a
child's best interests require that he "be placed in a secure and stable
environment, . . . not be indiscriminately moved from foster home to
foster home, and ... have the assurance of long-term permanency plan-
ning." 
12 9
The court held that "Choosing the least detrimental alternative
available under these circumstances will best serve A.V.M.'s inter-
ests.' 130 The "least detrimental alternative" standard acknowledges the
fact that thus far the system has failed to serve the best interests of the
child, that the injury to the child has already been done, and that the best
strategy at this point is for the court to make a decision which will not
increase or prolong the detrimental effects of the system's past failure.
Had the court opted instead for the "best interests" standard, clearly a
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Guggenheim, supranote 101, at 1428.
126. No. 88CA1074 (Colo. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 1989) (not selected for publication).
127. A.V.M,No. 88CA1074 at 1.
128. Id.
129. Id.; See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-102(l.5)(a) (2005).
130. A.V.M, No. 88CA 1074 at 2.
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reasonable person could have concluded that being raised by adoptive
parents of the same race would be in A.V.M's best interests. Similarly,
one could also argue that staying with the same foster parents who had
essentially raised him from birth would be in A.V.M.'s best interests.
The problem with the "best interests" standard therefore becomes clear in
situations such as A.V.M.'s where two different custody outcomes could
arguably serve the child's best interests. In this case, it is necessary to
apply the least detrimental alternative.
Recognizing that either alternative would serve the best interests of
A.V.M., the court must next consider which of the two alternatives
would be the least detrimental to the child. Removing A.V.M from the
only stable home he has ever known, based solely on the belief that a
African American family would be more culturally sensitive to his needs,
would clearly be disruptive and moreover devastating to a five year old
child. At this stage in his life, A.V.M. would unlikely share the trial
court's perception that his adoptive parents were not suitable. The only
factor a child of this age would care about is maintaining the parents he
has loved his entire life. The least detrimental alternative standard gives
more weight to A.V.M.'s viewpoint than does the "best interests" stan-
dard by requiring the judge to stand in the shoes of the child. Implemen-
tation of this standard in custody placement decisions would be a step
toward a greater appreciation for the unique needs of children.
C. Recommendations
This article urges two critical recommendations. First, to ensure
that every child has the right to and benefit of an effective attorney; and
second, to promote partnerships between specialist children's attorneys
and volunteer attorneys to enhance opportunities for every child to bene-
fit from an effective legal relationship.
1. Right to an Attorney
The majority of states statutorily require some form of attorney
guardian ad litem model of legal representation, whereby an attorney is
appointed to represent the child's best interests. 131 Traditional attorneys
are utilized in fewer states, and some states allow the appointment of
both guardian's ad litem and attorneys for children. 3 2 In Georgia, chil-
dren in the welfare system are assigned lawyers only in cases where the
state is seeking to terminate parental rights.' 33 This intolerable situation
gave rise to the recent federal district court decision by Judge Marvin H.
Shoob that "foster children have both a statutory and constitutional right
131. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-111 (2005).
132. DAVID KATNER ET AL., NACC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN
IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN 10-13 (Apr.
2001), at http://www.naccchildlaw.org/documents/naccrecommendations.doc-
133. Winn, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1357.
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to counsel .... ,,13 Additionally, an appellate court decision in Illinois
held that children have the right to substitute private counsel for their
court-appointed Public Guardian.'
35
In celebrating this huge step toward justice for children, attorneys
can now mobilize the legal talent to realize this achievement for every
child caught in the throes of a system that is failing them.
2. Promote Partnerships between Specialist Children's attorneys
and Volunteer Attorneys
a. The Need
In July 2004, The Pew Charitable Trust released a national survey
of more than 2,200 dependency court judges. The judges identified
overcrowded dockets and inadequate resources as the greatest obstacles
to finding safe, permanent homes for children. 136
Abused and neglected children have complex, urgent, and individu-
alized needs. Though there are many able and dedicated children's at-
torneys, most are faced with overwhelming caseloads, far beyond the
ability of an individual to devote the time and effort necessary for each
child. In addition to caseloads, the difficulty of repeatedly challenging
the inadequacies of the child protection system: depleted resources, mul-
tiple routine displacements, bureaucratic indecision, competing values
and contradictory visions leaves advocates emotionally and physically
exhausted. The time available for one child is severely limited.
Now, more than ever, children need attorneys with sufficient time to
go beyond legal advocacy and explore innovative and individualized
solutions, identify treatment resources, explore family and alternative
placements, and seek professionals willing to donate their time and talent
to serve the unmet needs of children. Children need attorneys with
whom they can develop a meaningful relationship; a relationship that
ensures the counseling role of an attorney's responsibility, as well as the
advocacy role. These roles allow an attorney to anticipate needs, prevent
problems, and ensure the critical implementation of treatment that is so
often delayed or non-existent.
The companion issues of huge caseloads and inadequate compensa-
tion have systemically colluded to deny children effective legal advo-
cacy. Burdensome caseloads are typically justified by the compensation
available, so compromising the legal needs of children becomes standard
134. Id.
135. In the Interest of A.W., 618 N.E.2d 729, 732-34 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
136. CHILDREN & FAMILY RESEARCH CENTER, VIEW FROM THE BENCH: OBSTACLES TO
SAFETY & PERMANENCY FOR CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE: SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS FROM A
NATIONAL SURVEY OF DEPENDENCY COURT JUDGES 1-4 (July 2004), at
http://www fosteringresults.org/results/reports.htm.
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fare. Attorneys have little time to challenge the routine harms inflicted
on children by multiple placements, the separation of siblings, and the
denial of timely treatment. Thus, individual children are often denied
basic safety and permanence. 137 Collectively, children continue to be
denied meaningful access to justice.
b. One Option
It need not be this way. We must instill spirit and meaning into the
system by viewing legislative mandates within a framework of innova-
tive and unlimited options. Volunteer attorneys engaging in pro bono
work on behalf of children is one option to complement the work of spe-
cialist attorneys. Specialists must work in partnership with volunteer
attorneys. The specialists provide the critical training, support, and nec-
essary consultation critical to the effective use of volunteer attorneys.
Particularly when a child is the beneficiary, pro bono work is not a mat-
ter of mere charity, but a matter of social and professional responsibil-
;t .138ity. Attorneys yearn for the opportunity to seek justice in an area of
the law where the level of satisfaction can rarely be replicated else-
where.
By engaging highly skilled, effective and talented attorneys, we can
enhance the quality of representation by ensuring adequate time and at-
tention to each child, reducing the caseloads of specialist attorneys, and
involving influential firms in statewide legislative battles for resources.
It is the experience of the author that volunteer attorneys are able to
spend a hundred hours getting to know a child, understanding his needs,
and exploring appropriate resources and placements, in part because they
are not constrained by the demands of hundreds of children. They bring
outstanding legal skills and support staff to enable them to zealously
advocate for clients. Further, because otherwise experienced counsel are
often newcomers to such matters, they offer novel ideas and persuasive
arguments in a system that is often closed to all but a close knit group of
attorneys. The potential impact of private attorney involvement in im-
proving service delivery for children cannot be underestimated. In the
area of children's law, everyday tragedies and national statistics demand
such innovative solutions.
The concept of pro bono attorneys is one crucial step to help mobi-
lize needed resources and create the child-centered system worthy of the
collective talent of all Of us. 139 The American Bar Association Litigation
137. Id.
138. Effective Jan. 1, 2005, Colorado allows lawyers to apply for and receive CLE credit for
pro bono legal representation. COLO. R. CIV. P. 260.8. See also JoAnn Vogt, New Rule Authorizes
CLE Credit for Pro Bono Representation, 34 COLO. LAW. 25, 25-26 (2005); see also Grob, infra,
note 139.
139. Seth A. Grob & Shari F. Shink, Advocating Excellence for Children: A Call to Action, in
CHILDREN'S LAW, POLICY, & PRACTICE 111, 134-47 (1995 ed.).
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Section's Children's Rights Committee is available to assist local com-
munities eager to recruit volunteer attorneys. 140 Additionally, there are
Children's Law Centers in many states with active volunteer pro bono
partnerships to offer models for replication. 14 1 By partnering with pro
bono attorneys, each state's Bar Association has the opportunity to make
the same critical difference for children that they have made for every
other protected class in history.
CONCLUSION
The needs of children in the court system and the demand for re-
form are as dire as at any time in our history. Abused children are
among the most vulnerable in our society and the most invisible. They
are no longer abstract statistics or unnamed faces in far off nations. Ju-
venile courts offer a window into the shattered lives of our children, yet
much of their suffering is preventable. Their suffering is the conse-
quence of deliberate decisions that should be morally and politically re-
pugnant to us.
One author suggests using a "civil rights" analysis for children. He
encourages us to fight to end the mistreatment and abuse of our children
with the moral outrage and indignation it deserves. 142 This approach is
supported by the continuing failure of our system to respond to the 1990
report of the United States Advisory Board on Child Abuse and Neglect
that warned of a "national emergency."' 143 So, too, by the 1991 Final
Report of the National Commission on Children that questioned the
moral character of a nation that tolerates the consistent presence of insti-
tutional immorality. 144 As a result of our failures, incalculable harm con-
tinues to be done to children and families, each state's finances and our
future.
We are nearing almost two decades since these reports were issued.
Since their release, the more recent Pew Report (2004) issues yet another
resounding cry for action, while our moral outrage remains stifled.
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We tolerate the injustice, settle for promises and boast about incremental
improvements.
140. See About the Children's Rights Litigation Committee, American Bar Association, at
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/committee/childrensl/home.html (last visited June 25, 2005).
141. Grob, supra note 139, at 147.
142. Lewis Pitts, Beyond Rhetoric to Due Process Protective Rights for Children: A Civil
Rights Approach is Imperative, in PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD ADVOCACY LAW IN THE EARLY 2 1
s
CENTURY 31, 48-49 (2000).
143. THE U.S. ADVISORY BOARD ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT: CRITICAL FIRST STEPS IN RESPONSE TO A NATIONAL EMERGENCY 1-9 (U.S. Gov't Print-
ing Office Stock No. 017-092-00104-5, 1990).
144. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEW AMERICAN AGENDA
FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 84 (Summary ed. 1991).
145. See supra note 136.
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Financial measures are needed to address the fundamental inequities
faced by the poor, abused and neglected children in our system. Re-
sources are needed for child protection, health care, mental health treat-
ment, social workers, and juvenile court counselors; and adequate com-
pensation for judges, court personnel, as well as attorneys to engage in
high quality litigation to ensure the basic necessities of life for all chil-
dren. Without such representation, children will continue to struggle
against the imbalance of power that corrodes their human spirits in uni-
maginable ways.
Yet, new strategies are also needed. We need a clarion call for chil-
dren - a visionary movement on behalf of our future. Like the civil
rights movement, we must draw upon creative lawyering, simultaneously
with public education and media strategies. We cannot stand by until
Congress and state legislatures allocate the necessary funds. It is profes-
sionally irresponsible to wait. We must take all necessary steps to as-
sume responsibility for the children who need us today.
Children, more than any other population in our community, need a
champion to assert their rights. As ministers of our system of justice,
lawyers are uniquely qualified to lead the movement in this vast pioneer
area called children's law. Judge Charles Gill, a co-convener of the Na-
tional Task Force for Children's Constitutional Rights, calls on attorneys
to provide the impetus for improving the legal system for children. He
declares attorneys are a powerful force in our country who "hold the key
to unlocking the bold, dramatic solutions needed by children and fami-
lies.',
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Only through diligent, persistent, and widespread efforts can we
reach a "tipping point" and move toward a more child-
centered system. 147 Perhaps the most critical role to be played by each of
us, specialists and pro bono attorneys alike, is making the injustice visi-
ble. Only by accepting our personal responsibility as attorneys, and as
human beings, can we begin to achieve for children what every other
disadvantaged population has won for itself - meaningful access to the
courts and fundamental fairness. Only then will we have achieved rec-
ognition of the compelling needs and rights of children.
In looking toward the future the Bar must have the foresight now to
identify the legal barriers and problems facing children and be able to
offer creative answers. The legal community must have a vision of what
tomorrow should resemble in terms of achieving excellence in outcomes
146. Telephone Interview with Charles D. Gill, Senior Judge, Connecticut Superior Court,
Litchfield Judicial District (July 6, 2005); see also Charles D. Gill, Essay on the Status ofthe Ameri-
can Child, 2000 A.D.: Chattel or Constitutionally Protected Child-Citizen?, 17 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
543 (1991).
147. See MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING PoNT: How LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG
DIFFERENCE 3-14 (2000).
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for our nation's "invisible" population. In charting that path, we must
not be constricted by resources, inertia, skepticism, and convention. For
as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. once said, "Injustice anywhere is a threat
to justice everywhere. We are caught in an inescapable network of mu-
tuality, tied in a single garment of destiny."' 
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148. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963) available at
http://www.stanford.edu/group/King/popular-requests/.
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